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1. Introduction  
Before fighting a potential rival, it is necessary to understand its defensive and 
offensive techniques.  By understanding a rival, it will be easier to defeat him.  China’s rise 
has surprised the international community not only in terms of its expansion but also in 
terms of economic growth, military power, and technological innovations.  While other 
hegemonic powers try to counter China’s strategy, China continues to adapt and take 
advantage of the international environment.  There is a remarkable resemblance between 
China’s Grand Strategy and Wing Chun, which is based on softness, speed, and a bamboo-
like flexibility.  
Wing Chun is a traditional martial art that originated in China almost 300 years 
ago.1  Its five core principles are engraved in Chinese history.2  Other countries need to 
decode China’s Grand Strategy if they want to counter its expansion and interdimensional 
growth.  Like Wing Chung, China’s Grand Strategy uses five principles which are helpful 
in deciphering China’s movements and tactics.  These principles are simplicity of non-
intervention policy, directness of a national cause, practicality in technological innovation, 
economy for international business, and minimum use of military force. 
 
2. Simplicity of non-intervention policy 
Since the 1950s, the non-intervention policy has been the trademark of China’s 
foreign relation strategy with regard to other countries’ internal affairs.3  As a result, China 
is perceived as an apparent suitable international partner because it will not try to intervene 
in other countries’ domestic issues regardless of their magnitude or context.  For instance, 
China’s voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council has shown a pattern of 
abstentionism, a strategy that serves to win partners that reject United Nations sanctions, 
while not alienating allies through the use of its veto power.4  The non-intervention policy 
has helped China to be perceived as non-dominant. In contrast, other hegemonic powers 
are perceived as interfering even though such perception might not be true.   
Unlike China, other regional powers like France, Spain, Belgium, and the United 
Kingdom are perceived as colonialist in some areas of the world because of their former 
colonial possessions in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas.  As a result, some 
extreme political groups and violent organizations include in their narratives the rejection 
of any country with a colonist past.  It is not surprising why the Vietnamese fought to the 
death for their independence from Western powers during the Vietnam War; they perceived 
American and French military interventions as new colonialist operations.5  Moreover, 
France’s anti-jihadist military operations are wrongfully used by terrorist groups to portray 
 
1 Steve Swift, “History and Lineage,” Grandmaster’s Wing Chun, 2017, accessed December 14, 2020, 
https://grandmasterswingchun.com/concepts-of-wing-chun-kung-fu/yip-mans-lineage/#:~:text=Wing Chun is the 
name,in the other Shaolin systems. 
2 International Wing Chung Academy, “Five Principles,” International Wing Chung Academy, 2020, accessed 
December 14, 2020, https://www.wingchun.edu.au/wing-chun/five-principles. 
3 Chen Zheng, “China Debates the Non-Interference Principle,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 
3 (2016): 351, doi: 10.1093/cjip/pow010. 
4 Christopher Holland, “Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and 
Intervention,” NYU Journal of International Law & Politics Online Forum 2012, 10. https://nyujilp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/Christopher-Holland-China-the-Security-Council-and-Intervention.pdf. 
5 Muhammet Güler, “France Should Compensate Vietnam for Colonization,” editorial, Daily Sabah, June 10, 2020, 
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/france-should-compensate-vietnam-for-colonization. 
themselves as victims and France as an enemy of Islam in order to get more recruits.6  
Similarly, the Taliban have passed down from generation to generation cultural narratives 
about how they successfully opposed military operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s 
and the 2000s, because they see themselves as true defenders against foreign colonizers.  
In contrast, China has been able to galvanize the aspiration of countries that feel 
dominated by Western hegemonic powers.  As a matter of fact, China is part of the five 
emerging national economies which include Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa.  
Additionally, China will not oppose countries that might bear resentment caused by 
Western sanctions, countries such as Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela. 
Furthermore, China’s non-intervention policy has weathered changing regional 
circumstances.  For instance, China has not dislodged military dictatorships in Thailand, 
the Philippines, or Myanmar despite being these countries within its geographical 
periphery.  It could be argued that China intervened with military support during the 
Korean War and the Vietnam War, but it only did so when these wars expanded to its 
borders and jeopardized its national security stability.  
 
3. Directness of a national cause: 
China has been able to unify its national instruments of power under the vision of 
recovering its sovereignty in areas that have been lost to other regional powers.  Under this 
vision, China has tried to reverse what is known as the Century of Humiliation, a period 
where a succession of hegemonic powers dominated China.  Consequently, it is imperative 
for China to reassert its sovereignty in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.  In 
that regard, China clearly demands the acceptance of a One China policy to establish 
political and economic relationships with any country.  There is no doubt about the 
consistency and significance of China regarding its national cause.  This political mindset 
has gradually paid off.  As of 2021, only 15 countries in the world still recognize Taiwan.7  
Because of its national cause, China uses any available tool to protect what it considers its 
sovereignty rights.  
There is a lot of debate about China’s compliance with the United Nations 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) because its current maritime claims 
contradict what it signed in 1982.  However, the fact that China signed and ratified the 
UNCLOS helps China negotiate with other Asian countries that share the same condition.  
As a result, China is able to discredit other contestants due to their unwillingness to sign 
this treaty based on national security reasons.  
Although some countries have a unifying vision, many have lost consistency in a 
national cause that could galvanize their whole society.  For instance, Manifest Destiny 
was a cultural belief that amalgamated the whole of American society for almost 100 years 
to expand territorial conquests and democratic ideas.  Likewise, there was a time when the 
United States was unified when it refused to appease dictatorial countries but became the 
arsenal of democracy during World War II.8  Similarly, containment was a strategic foreign 
 
6 Laurence Bindner, Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives Against France (The Hague, The Netherlands, 2018), 2–4, 
https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2018/02/Bindner-Jihadists-Grievance-Narratives-Against-France-February2018.pdf. 
7 Hilton Yip, “It’s Time to Stop Pandering to Beijing Over Taiwan,” editorial, Foreign Policy, May 8, 2020, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/08/us-taiwan-china-relations-stop-pandering-coronavirus/. 
8 Whitney Shepardson, “The United States as an Arsenal of Democracy,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Science 19, no. 3 (1941): 36–38, doi:10.2307/1172331. 
policy uniting Western countries in opposition to Communist expansion around the world 
for almost 50 years.  However, it is not clear what could represent a modern galvanizing 
national cause for most Western countries.  
 
4. Practicality in technological innovation 
China has shown increasing pragmatism in technological development.  China’s 
political mindset has embraced technological innovation as the key to hegemony.  This 
kind of high-tech creativity extends not only to entertainment technology but also to the 
military.  However, China’s advantage is that it can intentionally channel technological 
innovation into its military, international politics, and commerce.  For instance, the fact 
that China is one of nine countries with nuclear weapons capability is a clear sign of its 
technological revolution.   
Likewise, the development of China’s anti-satellite weapons is another feat that 
only the United States and Russia have accomplished.  The pragmatism of these 
accomplishments has the objective of deterring any nuclear-armed state.  As with Wing 
Chun’s set of grappling techniques, China can drag any potential adversary into close 
quarter combat—conventional war—which could last for decades.   
Additionally, China has pursued cutting-edge technologies like the Chengdu J-20 
in the air power domain and new generations of submarines and air carriers to achieve 
naval supremacy.  Similarly, China’s space program is catching up with those of America 
and Russia, which is worth considering.  Likewise, in terms of international politics, 
technology could have the potential to affect other countries’ trust.  In July 2020, the United 
States ordered the closure of China’s embassy in Texas under accusations of supposed 
espionage.9   
China has enhanced its technological platforms for commercial purposes. Decades 
ago, Chinese products were categorized as low-quality products; however, many Western 
companies currently outsource their products to be manufactured in China.10  As a result, 
it is possible that China has employed benchmarking, intelligence gathering, and 
knowledge transfer to progressively achieve parity in international commerce.  For 
instance, out of the 100 World’s Largest Public Companies ranking, 20 of the companies 
are Chinese.11  While the United States still dominates the international market with 37 
companies in this ranking, China’s closest competitors are Japan with eight companies and 
Germany with five.  As a consequence, China’s success in international business paves the 
way for its growing diplomatic and military power, which makes other hegemonic powers 
raise eyebrows.  
 
5. Economy for international business  
China knows that the currency of the world is conducting business.  As a result, 
China is mostly interested in international business deals regardless of the type of political 
system a particular country might have.  This principle emphasizes the reduction of time 
 
9 John Strohm, “Years of Chinese Spying Led to Consulate Closing, U.S. Says,” editorial, Bloomberg, July 24, 2020, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-24/years-of-chinese-espionage-prompted-consulate-closing-u-s-
says. 
10 Insight, “Is the Quality of Products Made in China Really That Bad?,” Insight Quality Services, 2019, December 
26, 2020, https://insight-quality.com/quality-of-products-made-in-china/. 
11 Andrea Murphy et al., “Global 2000: The World’s Largest Public Companies,” Forbes, 2020, accessed December 
26, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/global2000/#23f56c3d335d. 
and energy to do international business.  It could be argued that China is not one of the 
easiest countries to do business with, but its economy for international business is focused 
on saving time and resources in connecting global trade with China.  The best expression 
of this principle is the new Silk Road, which is China’s strategic economic plan to invest 
trillion of dollars in infrastructure and loans in more than 60 countries to connect China 
with the rest of the world through digital, land, and maritime platforms.12 
It could be argued that China’s loans to Sri Lanka and Pakistan are the perfect proof 
of how China likes to set debt traps to convert sovereign countries into vassals.13  
Nonetheless, any state will set conditions to guarantee the repayment of substantial loans.  
On the other hand, even if the stories about China’s alleged debt traps were true, that would 
not be the first time that a powerful country has taken decisive action to protect its 
economic interests.  For instance, in 1902, Germany, Britain, and Italy sent their naval 
forces to conduct a naval blockade that lasted for three months to force Venezuela to repay 
its international loans.14   
Despite the previous considerations, China’s political will to expand international 
business deals opens new doors to increase its influence.  Contrary to Western countries 
with little or non-existent regulation of private companies, China is able to direct its 
extensive networks of state-owned companies to serve its strategic long and short-term 
objectives.  Together with its non-intervention policy, China’s gradual expansion of 
international business deals causes it to be perceived as non-threatening to other regimes 
because China will focus its interest on augmenting commercial relationships and 
requesting guarantees of loan repayment instead of demanding changes of political systems 
or social reforms. 
 
6. Minimum use of military force 
Like Wing Chun, which avoids the employment of brute force and instead focuses 
on redirection, leverage, structure, and relaxation to counter any attack, China makes 
minimum use of military force to protect its strategic national interests.15  Many hegemonic 
powers define war as a military confrontation with the unavoidable consequence of 
thousands of deaths and casualties.  Contrary to this notion, China avoids the employment 
of brute military force to repel an adversary.  To illustrate this idea, China deploys its coast 
guard vessels for law enforcement missions despite its capacity to conduct military 
operations, which helps create ambiguity.16  Other global powers have done the same.  For 
instance, the Japanese Coast Guard has been steadily conducting law enforcement 
 
12 Anna Bruce, “China’s $900 Billion New Silk Road. What You Need to Know,” World Economic Forum, 2017, 
accessed December 26, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/china-new-silk-road-explainer/. 
13 Gravitas Desk, “Debt-Trap: China’s Loans to Sri Lanka Are Not Driven by Benevolence,” editorial, Wion TV 
Channel, October 13, 2020, https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/debt-trap-chinas-loans-to-sri-lanka-are-not-driven-
by-benevolence-335053. 
14 Rick Chersicla, “The Venezuela Crisis Revisited,” Real Clear Defense, 2019, accessed December 26, 2020, 
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/30/the_venezuela_crisis_revisited_114377.html. 
15 International Wing Chung Academy, “Minimum Use of Brute Strength,” International Wing Chung Academy, 2020, 
accessed December 26, 2020, https://www.wingchun.edu.au/wing-chun/five-principles/minimum-use-of-brute-
strength. 
16 Katsuya Yamamoto, “The China Coast Guard as a Part of the China Communist Party’s Armed Forces,” The 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2020, accessed December 26, 2020, 
https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/yamamoto_01.html. 
operations and used deadly force against a North Korean vessel entering Japanese 
territorial waters in 2001.17  
However, China will avoid conventional military confrontations and instead defend 
its interests by, for instance, warfare techniques like ramming to disable boats or aerial 
maneuvers to deter foreign military planes.  A case in point occurred in 2009 when two 
Chinese trawlers stopped in front of the USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) in the South 
China Sea.18  Later, in 2014 and 2017, Chinese fighter planes flew near a U.S. Navy Boeing 
P-8 Poseidon and a U.S. Air Force Navy Lockheed EP-3 Ares to perform barrel roll 
maneuvers over those military planes.19  While many war experts are analyzing the 
prospects of a potential war and waiting to see who takes the first shot between the military 
forces of China and the United States in the South China Sea, China is already at war—a 
war defined by different parameters, not by Western standards.   
 
7. Recommendations 
China’s Grand Strategy is virtually dense because of its capacity to adapt and 
incorporate many defensive and offensive technics.  Like martial arts, no grand strategy is 
flawless.  If Western powers and Asian countries want to counter China’s Grand Strategy, 
they should attack the only recognized weakness of this national strategy. In that regard, 
traditional Wing Chung has its Achilles’ heel in ground fighting, which is mastered by 
other martial arts such as Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu, Catch Wrestling, Judo, and Sambo.  As a 
result, other hegemonic powers could find a weakness in China’s Grand Strategy by 
engaging in economic ground fighting.   
However, any ground game would be virtually impossible because such a technique 
requires the opponent to throw himself on the ground to apply a submission grappling 
technic.  In other words, any country that dares to engage in ground fighting should be able 
to affect its own economic system by imposing sanctions, cutting off economic 
relationships, and raising tariffs, which would be counterproductive in both the short and 
long term for itself.  The fact that many American multinational corporations are receiving 
exponential growth benefits by entering China’s market would make an economic war 
undesirable.  Moreover, no economic ground fighting will work if China is still the largest 
creditor in the world and the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt.  By the same token, China 
needs its products to be sold in the American market.20   
Consequently, some countries should decode China’s Grand Strategy if they want 
to adapt to a multilateral world order that is not based on a traditional Cold War mentality.  
First, military intervention is strictly necessary when territorial sovereignty is in danger.  
The study of modern history has demonstrated how the overextension of foreign military 
operations can suffer defeat when they are driven by political reasons alone and not by the 
 
17 Mina Pollman, “The Ever-Evolving Importance of Japan’s Coast Guard,” The Diplomat, 2019, accessed January 
16, 2021, https://cis.mit.edu/publications/analysis-opinion/2019/ever-evolving-importance-japan’s-coast-guard. 
18 Chris Buckley, “China Says U.S. Naval Ship Broke the Law,” editorial, Reuters, March 9, 2009, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-idUSPEK9458120090310. 
19 Ryan Pickrell, “7 Times the Russian and Chinese Got Dangerously Close to the US Military,” editorial, Business 
Insider, November 5, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/seven-times-the-us-russian-and-chinese-militaries-
came-close-to-disaster-2018-11#russian-su-27-flanker-intercepted-a-us-air-force-rc-135-reconnaissance-aircraft-on-
july-19-2017-3. 
20 Investopedia, “How Much U.S. Debt Does China Own?,” Investopedia, 2020, accessed January 10, 2021, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080615/china-owns-us-debt-how-much.asp. 
necessity of protecting territorial sovereignty.  For instance, some hegemonic powers have 
made the mistake of flexing their military muscles to show off their power.  If sovereignty 
is not in jeopardy it will be difficult to assemble all the national instruments of power to 
win a war.   
Second, although it is difficult to define, political leaders need to delineate a long-
term national cause based on the precise protection of the homeland.  The spiritual unity of 
the whole of society under the flag of protecting the country is something that should 
always be desirable because the concept of country is tangible enough to galvanize minds 
and souls.  Events like the Holocaust, the Pearl Harbor attack, and the September 11 attacks 
are examples of how tragic and historical events can galvanize societies for a period of 
time and provide the motivation to protect the country against potential attacks. 
Nonetheless, the national cause should focus on protecting and recovering what is 
legally under the control of the state.  Without a true national cause, the military can 
experience unintended consequences.  For instance, the 1982 Argentine military junta 
wrongfully decided to fight for sovereignty in the Falklands islands without acknowledging 
that the British government had already been governing it for 141 years.  That is the reason 
why France’s military operations are wrongfully called ‘Françafrique’; it is because they 
are perceived as a modern French intervention and subjugation of its former colonies in the 
African continent.21  As a result, any country should strengthen a national cause through 
the protection of its air, naval, and land domains. 
Thirdly, while developing their own technology, countries should improve their 
international business relationships.  If a country continues to depend on other countries’ 
technologies, it will not evolve to become a global power.  As a result, gradual knowledge 
transfer should be a promoted policy for multinational companies operating in any country.  
Without knowledge transfer, multinational companies will only gain millions of dollars 
and leave a country in a state of continuous dependency.  Although governments should 
incentivize the operation of multinational companies in their territories, they should 
encourage functional mechanisms that secure the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge. 
At the same time, governments should allocate great amounts of money for research 
and development through projects in state institutions and partner with the academic and 
private sectors.  However, many countries make the mistake of not investing in 
technological innovation, which opens the door for continuous foreign dependency.  While 
developed countries in North America and Western Europe spend nearly 2.5 percent of 
their GDP in research and development, Latin America, Arab states, and Sub-Sahara Africa 
invest less than 0.5 percent.22  Ironically, Latin American and Arab states have a military 
expenditure equivalent to 3.3 to 4 percent of their GDP.23   China’s Grand Strategy 
demonstrates that investing in technological research and development is the foundation 
for economic, military, and political success.  
 
21 Boubacar Diop, “Françafrique: A Brief History of a Scandalous Word,” New African Magazine (London, United 
Kingdom, March 2018), https://newafricanmagazine.com/16585/. 
22 UNESCO, “How Much Does Your Country Invest in R&D?,” UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2021, accessed 
January 15, 2021, http://uis.unesco.org/apps/visualisations/research-and-development-spending/. 
23 Elizabeth González, “Weekly Chart: Military Spending in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Americas Society / 
Council of the Americas, 2017, accessed January 16, 2021, https://www.as-coa.org/articles/weekly-chart-military-
spending-latin-america-and-caribbean; Florence Gaub, “Arab Military Spending: Behind the Figures,” European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014, accessed January 16, 2021, 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_27_Arab_military_spending.pdf. 
On the other hand, countries should redirect their interest in boosting international 
relations and design economic and political reforms to avoid trade deficits.  Unlike China, 
many countries have become mere consumers because the trade gap is the wrongfully 
accepted norm.  Despite the devastating effects of COVID-19, China’s economy has been 
resilient and has a trade surplus of $535 billion, which represents the best economic 
performance in the world during the year 2020.24  Also, economic success should translate 
into benefits for the whole of society.  A case in point is the Gini Index, which indicates 
that China has a better wealth distribution than countries like Brazil, Turkey, and South 
Africa.25 
Likewise, many governments measure the success of their international economic 
relationship in terms of free trade agreements with other global powers—agreements 
which, in some cases, have the negative effect of flooding local markets and destroying 
national production.  Consequently, countries can experience a reduction in tax revenue, 
destruction of natural resources, substandard working conditions, crowding out of local 
companies, and inability of small farmers to compete with industrialized companies.26   
Fourth, countries should be politically conscious and massively invest in the 
branches of their armed forces that can serve dual purposes.  Coast guard and police units, 
for example, can simultaneously perform law enforcement and military functions, and this 
can serve the interest of states.  For instance, the U.S. Coast Guard is not a second-class 
armed service; instead, it is one of the five components of the American armed forces, and 
it is employed for power projection.  Additionally, well-prepared coast guard units and 
modernized police could combine with air and naval military forces to achieve power 
projection and deter potential adversaries. 
Nonetheless, many countries do not pursue that path, and polices forces and coast 
guard units are therefore relegated to a position of secondary importance in terms of 
recognition, budget, and command.  If a nation wants to achieve maximum maritime 
operational effectiveness, it should understand that a navy, which is designed for 
warfighting and protection from foreign aggression, cannot replace a coast guard.27  
Moreover, if this is not understood, nations will have gargantuan but inefficient and slow 
armed forces which absorb massive economical resources without any tangible results. 
 
8. Conclusion  
Wing Chun is a Chinese traditional martial art which reflects the spirit of 
modernization, expansion, and growth of China among different global powers.  There is 
a remarkable resemblance between Wing Chun and China’s Grand Strategy.  However, 
many countries should decode China’s Grand Strategy.  In that regard, the components of 
China’s Grand Strategy are simplicity of non-intervention policy, directness of a national 
 
24 James Mayger et al., “China Ends 2020 With Record Trade Surplus as Pandemic Goods Soar,” Bloomberg, 2021, 
accessed January 16, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-14/china-s-trade-surplus-hits-record-
as-pandemic-fuels-exports#:~:text=The trade surplus of %2478.2,and the highest since 2015. 
25 Peter Westfall, “Gini Index,” Investopedia, 2020, accessed January 16, 2021, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gini-index.asp#:~:text=The Gini index%2C or Gini,wealth distribution among 
a population. 
26 Kimberly Amadeo, “Free Trade Agreements With Their Pros and Cons,” The Balance, 2020, accessed January 16, 
2021, https://www.thebalance.com/free-trade-agreement-pros-and-cons-3305845. 
27 Prabhakaran Paleri, Coast Guard Of The World And Emerging Maritime Threats (Tokyo, Japan, 2009), 49, 
https://www.spf.org/_opri_media/publication/pdf/200903_ISSN1880-0017.pdf. 
cause, practicality for technological innovation, economy for international business, and 
minimum use of military force.  Although China’s Grand Strategy could have a 
disadvantage in economic groundwork, any nation will need to throw down its entire 
commercial system, which would produce an ineffective result due to China’s robust 
economic system.  Consequently, it is important to decipher China’s Grand Strategy 
because of its flexibility, adaptiveness, and efficacy to defeat multiple contestants.   
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